Understanding Security Behavior of Real Users: Analysis of a Phishing Study by Kang, Mingqing et al.




Johns Hopkins University 
mkang31@jhu.edu 
Matthew Shonman 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
mshonma1@alumni.jh.edu 
Anshul Subramanya 




Johns Hopkins University 
harol@jhu.edu 
Xiangyang Li 
Johns Hopkins University 
xyli@jhu.edu 
Anton Dahbura 





This paper presents a set of statistical analyses on 
an empirical study of phishing email sorting by real 
online users. Participants were assigned to multitasking 
and/or incentive conditions in unattended web-based 
tasks that are the most realistic in any comparable study 
to date. Our three stages of analyses included logistic 
regression models to identify individual phishing 
“cues” contributing to successful classifications, 
statistical significance tests assessing the links between 
participants’ training experience and self-assessments 
of success to their actual performance, significance tests 
searching for significant demographic factors 
influencing task completion performance, and lastly k-
means clustering based on a range of performance 
measures and utilizing participants’ demographic 
attributes. In particular, the results indicate that 
multitasking and incentives create complex dynamics 
while demographic traits and cybersecurity training can 
be informative predictors of user security behavior. 
These findings strongly support the benefits of security 
training and education and advocate for customized and 
differentiated interventions to increase users’ success of 
correctly identifying phishing emails.  
1. Introduction  
Most studies to understand users’ security behavior 
have been conducted in controlled lab environments 
where participants might vary their behaviors at the 
presence of distracting or even intrusive factors. Apart 
from measuring broad performance indicators of task 
success based on predetermined criteria (e.g., “right” or 
“not very secure”), many of these studies relied on self-
reported feedback from participants. Partly due to such 
constraints, it is hard to comprehensively examine the 
relationships between users’ operations, performance, 
and demographic characteristics. 
The empirical study presented in this paper tasked 
participants with sorting 40 emails as legitimate or 
phishing within a set time duration. It also introduced a 
multitasking requirement and a monetary incentive. 
Participants were recruited through the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk human subject pool to conduct web-
based tasks remotely. Data capture techniques 
administered through the webmail platform Roundcube 
(https://roundcube.net) and the survey platform 
Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com) collect fine 
details of user operations, e.g., mouse movements and 
clicks, continuously. 
This work aims to make two contributions. First, 
the empirical study used real emails in a realistic task 
environment on computer users in an unattended fashion 
to capture security behaviors of high fidelity. The 
analyses lend insight into patterns of participants’ 
performance on phishing detection tasks. It also showed 
that a user’s demographic background, e.g., education, 
training, and age, bear correlation with performance 
indicators of security risk and operating time in such 
email sorting tasks. Second, our methodology combines 
a range of statistical tests with clustering analysis to 
explore a broad degree of useful knowledge. The 
analyses range from traditional significance tests, to 
regression modeling using phishing cues, and to k-
means clustering that simultaneously considers multiple 
performance measures. These methods are able to 
identify unique subpopulations among participants that 
exhibited differing behaviors. The results further 
revealed the complexity of different users interacting 
with email elements and how a range of internal and 
external factors impact their security decisions.  
2. Background 
2.1. Cybersecurity user studies 
Several studies have examined how users respond 





to phishing emails such as the impact of using mobile 
devices. In one prominent effort, Vishwanath et al. 
developed the Suspicion, Cognition, and Automaticity 
Model (SCAM) to describe the cognitive, preconscious, 
and automatic processes contributing to phishing 
success [8]. The model specifically highlights 
interrelations between factors such as individuals’ 
preexisting cyber-risk beliefs, suspicion, and multiple 
information processing modes. Two empirical tests 
supported SCAM predictions, finding, for instance, that 
greater awareness of online cyber risks led university 
students to process suspected emails more thoroughly, 
while students with less concern for such risks tended to 
judge emails according to simple decision rules. 
In a study of similar phishing email sorting tasks 
[4], the authors illustrated the effectiveness of using the 
double system lens model, a judgment analysis 
technique with linear regression, to understand both 
how users synthesized phishing cues to make a 
judgment and how effective those cues were in the 
environment in which the judgments were made. For 
each participant model, the cue weights represented how 
the user used each cue. For the environment model, the 
cue weights represented how diagnostic that cue was for 
identifying a phishing email. Although not 
generalizable beyond the emails analyzed in the 
research, this effort identified lack of signer details, lack 
of branding/logos, and the presence of suspicious links 
as the most relevant cues in classifying an email. 
Extensive research in computer security, and more 
generally in psychology, has utilized unattended web-
based questionnaires, camera recording, and other 
participant self-reported data. For example, Bianchi et 
al. [2] used Amazon Mechanical Turk to study Android 
users’ ability to resist GUI confusion attacks, which 
utilize social engineering principles similar to those in 
phishing attempts. They developed an emulated 
Android GUI remotely accessible via a web browser. 
In [9], the authors performed a series of 
significance tests on the data of the present empirical 
study, finding that multitasking worsened participants’ 
sorting accuracy and that, in general, differences 
between the conditions affected participants’ ability to 
sort phishing emails, but not legitimate emails. Incentive 
alone, by contrast, made no difference in either 
multitasking or no-multitasking cases. Multitasking and 
incentive showed opposite effects on email processing 
time: multitasking reduced users’ email processing 
time, while the incentive increased this value. However, 
spending more time on individual emails did not 
guarantee better sorting accuracy. 
2.2. Analysis of user demographics 
A study by Sheng et al. [5] is one of the most 
relevant studies on phishing susceptibility with a focus 
on demographic analysis. Through a large-scale 
roleplay survey using simulated emails, the authors 
found that gender and age can predict risks of falling for 
phishing attempts, and that educational material helped 
to reduce it. The results were consistent with several 
other studies including that by Kumaraguru et al. [3]. 
A number of previous studies explored the role of 
demographic factors of users in other cybersecurity 
applications. For example, Akhawe and Felt [1] studied 
web users’ tendencies to dismiss or respond to browser 
security warnings. They found behavioral differences 
between early adopters of new browser updates and 
users who waited for default browser releases, 
attributing some of these distinctions to varying levels 
of technical ability among individuals. By contrast, 
Sunshine et al. studied user responses to Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) warnings and found little effect from 
technical expertise [7]. In a second experiment 
comparing the effects of various real and designed SSL 
notifications, the researchers additionally found no 
significant differences from gender. 
3. Methodology  
3.1. A user study of email sorting 
The research team progressed through our 
university’s IRB review and approval process. 177 
participants from the United States progressed through 
this study in late 2017. The analysis focused on the 146 
participants who sorted all 40 emails in the given time. 
Experimental Design - Participants functioned as 
a personal assistant directed to classify emails into either 
a “keep” or “suspicious” folder. As shown in Table 1, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions. Multitasking participants 
answered 20 sets of questions through Qualtrics while 
sorting the emails, as shown in Figure 1. Each question 
set was presented for a maximum of two minutes; 
participants could manually advance to the next set after 
one minute elapsed. Thus, multitasking participants had 
40 minutes at most to complete both tasks. For the no-
multitasking condition, participants were given 30 
minutes to complete only the email sorting task. The 
right side of the screen showed a countdown timer 
instead of the multitasking questions. 
Table 1. Experimental condition and the 
number of participants (in parentheses) 
 Incentivized Non-incentivized 
Multitasking 1 (35) 3 (34) 
No-multitasking 2 (42) 4 (35) 
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Incentivized participants could earn additional 
monetary compensation based on the number of 
correctly sorted emails. For those participants in the 
multitasking with incentive condition, earning extra 
money also depended on the number of multitasking 
questions answered accurately. Participants were 
eligible for the incentive if they correctly sorted 30/40 
emails and correctly answered 15/20 multitasking 
questions. More information is available at 
http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/. 
Email Design and Phishing Cues - All 40 emails 
were created from real emails with personally 
identifiable information modified. Twenty (20) phishing 
emails were derived from a semi-random sample of 
emails in Cornell University’s “Phish Bowl” database 
(https://it.cornell.edu/phish-bowl). The other 20 
legitimate emails were derived from emails received by 
the research team. 
We analyzed a series of 12 information or phishing 
cues, contained within the emails, implying whether 
those emails are legitimate or phishing. Crucially, 
legitimate emails may contain suspicious cues, such as 
misspellings or an absent greeting, while phishing 
emails may contain non-suspicious cues to seem 
legitimate. However, phishing emails on average 
contained more suspicious cues than legitimate emails, 
providing a path to accurate classification. All cues and 
definitions are available at http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/ 
with some examples given below. 
• URL Hyperlinking: are displayed hyperlinks 
mismatched with the underlying links? 
• Spelling and Grammar Errors: does the text 
contain spelling or grammar mistakes? 
• Use of Threatening Language: does the email 
threaten a negative consequence if instructions 
unfollowed? 
3.2. Data collection 
Log Files and Information Extraction - Each log 
file represented a single user, and every line in the file 
was an event. Each event record included timestamps, 
the user identification, the operation taken, and 
additional information relevant to the operation. These 
operations consisted of common user interactions with 
a webpage, including mouse clicking, hovering, 
scrolling, and moving over objects on the Roundcube 
and Qualtrics user interfaces, such as menus, buttons, 
links, email attachments, questions, and answer choices. 
Moreover, specific events were triggered when a user’s 
mouse moved between the Roundcube and Qualtrics 
windows. 
 The log file data also enabled determination of 
metrics such as total email processing time. For the no-
multitasking conditions, this value was defined as the 
time interval between a user opening (clicking on) an 
email and classifying (moving) that email. For the 
multitasking conditions, processing time excluded any 
period when the mouse cursor was in the Qualtrics 
window. 
Demographics and Self-Reported Information - 
We collected self-reported demographics and other 
information on participants’ experiences to aid in 
interpreting the experimental results. Items considered 
in our analysis included age, education level, and 
experience with network or cybersecurity 
courses/certificates. We also utilized participants’ self-
rated confidence in each email classification decision (1: 
not confident at all, to 10: extremely confident) and their 
own estimates of email sorting accuracy. 
Behavioral Performance Measures - Six 
performance measures were directly extracted from log 
files for each participant (Table 2). The first pair is the 
Figure 1. Multitasking condition where a participant classifies emails and answers questions 
concurrently 
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processing times for phishing and legitimate emails 
respectively, measured as the total time spent on all the 
emails in each category. The second pair is the average 
confidence ratings for phishing and legitimate emails 
respectively. The third pair is false negative rate (FNR) 
and false positive rate (FPR), which are the error rates 
for phishing and legitimate email classifications 
respectively. 
3.3. Data analysis methodology 
This work aimed to further understand our detailed 
empirical study results, focusing on identifying 
emerging subpopulations that are different in their 
security behaviors. As shown in Figure 2, we employed 
a three-stage approach toward this goal. 
Cue and User Confidence Analyses - The first-
stage analyses looked further into participants’ 
performance in different condition groups. Principal 
component analysis (PCA) was performed to identify 
correlations between different email cues, ultimately 
reducing the full cue set to a smaller number of non-
correlated cues. Next, for each participant, a logistic 
classifier was trained using that participant’s email 
classification results in order to weight the significance 
of each cue for a given user’s decisions. One-way 
ANOVAs, Tukey’s test, and Welch’s t-test were 
performed to identify whether experimental condition 
influenced the use of each cue. Finally, correlation tests 
were conducted between individuals’ self-estimated and 
actual sorting accuracy. 
Demographic Partitioning Analyses - We then 
concentrated on analyses that partitioned the 
participants according to their demographic factors of 
age, education, and cybersecurity training. ANOVAs 
were performed within each condition group to assess 
demographic differences in participants in terms of how 
they valued the various cues in an email. Additional 
statistical analysis was performed to determine the 
impact of past training on sorting accuracy. Correlations 
between estimated and actual performance were again 
examined, this time distinguishing between trained and 
untrained participants. 
Clustering Analysis - Some of the above analyses 
identified statistically significant differences on 
individual performance measures. However, we had 
difficulty clearly categorizing and understanding the 
entire participant population through these tests. This 
may suggest that the subpopulations did not prominently 
vary along any single performance measure. After 
trying several clustering methods, we utilized k-means 
clustering to simultaneously consider all six 
performance measures. 
4. Analysis and findings  
4.1. Phishing cue and decision confidence 
analyses 
We first performed PCA by evaluating correlations 
between the appearance of unique cues among the 40 
emails. Significant correlations (Pearson correlation 
coefficient p < 0.05) were present between multiple sets 
of cues, and so we narrowed our scope to a subset of 
eight non-correlated cues from the original twelve: 
Suspicious Sender Display Name, URL Hyperlinking, 
Poor Overall Design, Generic Greeting, Use of Time 
Pressure, Use of Emotional Appeals, Too Good to be 
True Offers, and Request for Personal Information. 
Further analysis used only these non-correlated cues. 
Next, we trained a logistic model using the email 
classification results for each participant. For an email 
classified as “phishing,” y is ‘1’; for emails classified as 
“legitimate,” y is ‘0.’ Each of these emails has its own 
set of indicators, X, corresponding to whether each of 
the eight cues selected above is present. Thus, the 
Table 2. Six user performance measures 
Performance Measure Definition 
Processing time (phishing) Measured in seconds, range of 
value is approximately (0,1050) 
Processing time (legitimate) Measured in seconds, range of 
value is approximately (0, 900) 
Average rating (phishing) Range [0,10] 
Average rating (legitimate) Range [0,10] 
False negative rate (FNR) Range [0,1] 
False positive rate (FPR) Range [0,1] 
 
Cue and User Confidence 
Analyses 
• PCA 
• Logistic classifier 
• ANOVAs on experimental 
condition effects 
• Correlation tests between 




• Welch’s t-tests 
• Correlation tests 
• ANOVAs on demographic 
factors 
Clustering Analysis 
• K-means clustering; 
k = 2-8 
Figure 2. An analysis approach combining three stages 
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independent variables per user constituted a 40 x 8 
binary matrix, and our dependent variables composed a 
40 x 1 binary matrix. Our analysis assumed that every 
user processed each cue in an email. 
In this logistic model, the weights indicate each 
cue’s importance to the participant’s classification of an 
email. These weights were then averaged over each 
condition group as shown in Table 3. For example, Poor 
Email Design was highly characteristic of a phishing 
email in all four groups, while Too Good to be True 
Offers and Generic Greetings were less indicative. 
Eight separate one-way ANOVAs were performed, 
one for each non-correlated cue, to compare the effect 
of experiment condition on the use of the cue. 
Significant differences at the p < 0.05 level occurred for 
only two cues: URL Hyperlinking (p = 0.029) and Too 
Good to be True Offers (p = 0.031). However, 
performing Tukey’s test for these two cues failed to 
demonstrate any significant difference in weights 
between these condition groups. 
Next, multiple t-tests revealed a difference in 
confidence ratings between conditions 3 and 4 (Table 
4). When the incentive was absent, the single-task 
participants reported slightly higher confidence ratings 
than those assigned the secondary task. However, 
applying Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons revealed no significant difference in 
performance between experimental groups, indicating 
that the former group’s sorting accuracy did not improve 
despite spending more time per email and their higher 
confidence ratings. This may show a challenge that 
participants faced in asserting their decisions, even 
when they focused only on email sorting. 
Lastly, we calculated correlation coefficients 
between participants’ self-estimated and actual numbers 
of correctly sorted emails (Table 5). Significant 
correlations were identified for conditions 3 and 4. We 
found no significant correlation for the incentive 
participants (conditions 1 and 2); counterintuitively, this 
result may represent the incentive having pressured 
participants into overthinking their email sorting 
actions. 
4.2. Demographic analyses based on 
partitioning participants  
Previous analyses had alerted us to the 
complicating effect imposed by multitasking on 
participants’ behaviors. We first focused demographic 
comparisons of the no-multitasking participant groups 
(2 and 4). For age-based tests, participants were split 
into two groups (age ranges 20-38 and 39-56 for 
condition 2; 22-41 and 42-61 for condition 4) and then 
three groups (age ranges 20-33, 34-47, 48-61 for 
condition 2; 22-34, 35-48, 49-61 for condition 4), with 
divisions based on keeping group sizes equal. Welch’s 
t-tests were taken comparing all of these condition 
groups. Similar partitions were taken for participants’ 
highest education achieved (one of seven values ranging 
from no high school to doctorate) as well. However, 
none of these tests found significant results. 
Similarly, we performed ANOVAs to analyze the 
role that demographic factors played on participants’ 
perception of different email cues, including: 
























0.49 -0.32 1.02 -0.04 0.36 -0.53 0.15 0.30 
2. Incentivized No-
multitasking 
0.53 -0.18 1.00 -0.16 0.45 -0.39 0.12 0.28 
3. Non-incentivized 
Multitasking 
0.51 -0.25 1.01 -0.11 0.39 -0.35 0.18 0.34 
4. Non-incentivized 
No-multitasking 
0.59 -0.09 0.90 -0.13 0.39 -0.42 0.32 0.25 
 
 Table 4. Confidence ratings for experimental 
conditions 

























Table 5. Correlation between self-estimated and 




1. Incentivized Multitasking 0.253 p=0.142 
2. Incentivized No-multitasking 0.272 p=0.082 
3. Non-incentivized Multitasking 0.467 p=0.005 
4. Non-incentivized No-multitasking 0.336 p=0.048 
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• Student Status (Yes/No) 
• Highest Education Achieved (1: No High 
School Diploma, 2: High School, 3: Some 
College, 4: Two-Year Associate, 5: Four-Year 
Bachelor, 6: Master’s Degree, 7: Doctorate 
Degree) 
• Cybersecurity Training Experience (Yes/No) 
• Age (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, ...) 
Performing Tukey’s test on the results found some 
differences among participant subpopulations, as in 
Table 6. For example, being a student or not was a 
significant differentiator in several cases including the 
usage of Generic Greeting in decision making. In 
another example, Poor Overall Design affected several 
age groups differently. 
Furthermore, 13 participants previously completed 
a network engineering or cybersecurity 
course/certificate. For t-tests exploring this factor, we 
divided the participants into four groups based on the 
presence or absence of past cybersecurity training and 
whether those participants had faced a multitasking 
requirement. We chose to not divide these groups by the 
incentive condition, as it did not seem to affect 
performance. 
Table 7 shows the trained no-multitasking group 
achieved the highest email sorting accuracy. 
Cybersecurity training did improve the classification 
accuracy quite significantly when email sorting was the 
only task. However, the trained multitasking group did 
not perform better than the untrained multitasking. This 
shows again the challenge presented by multitasking, 
which complicated the effectiveness of training. Using 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
yielded significant differences between group 2-group 3 
and group 2-group 4. 
Lastly, we expanded statistical tests on the 
correlation coefficients between participants’ self-
estimated and true numbers of correctly sorted emails 
by looking at their cybersecurity training experience. As 
shown in Table 8, the 13 participants with cybersecurity 
knowledge achieved a higher correlation coefficient, 
seeming to suggest that they possessed better self-
awareness of their performance than did other subjects. 
This conclusion would be further supported with a 
larger sample of such participants. 
The complexity of the above statistical tests to find 
subpopulations among participants and the required 
computational cost are obvious. Any single 
performance measure may not be discriminating enough 
to efficiently find heterogenous participant subsets. The 
small sample sizes resulting from demographic 
partitioning present an additional challenge. These 
observations strongly influenced our decision to pursue 
clustering analysis, described below. 
Table 8. Correlation between self-estimated 
and actual numbers of correctly sorted emails 
based on cybersecurity training experience 
Group Correlation Coefficient T-test 
Trained 0.552 p=0.050 
Untrained 0.322 p=0.0001 
 
Table 6. Demographic analysis on phishing cue weights of logistic models 
Experimental 
Condition 
Demographic Email Cue Population 1 Population 1 
Cue Weight 




Student Status Generic Greeting Student 0.323 Non-Student 0.101 
Age Poor Overall 
Design 
Ages 30-39 1.276 Ages 60-70 0.377 






























Student Status Use of Emotional 
Appeal 
Student 0.064 Non-Student 0.458 
 
Table 7. Impact of cybersecurity training 
experience on sorting accuracy 











1,2: t=-3.027, p=0.022 
2,3: t=4.093, p=0.002 





2,3: t=4.093, p=0.002 





2,4: t=5.360, p=0.0000734 




4.3. Clustering analysis 
As the monetary incentive showed no significant 
effect on participants’ performance, participants were 
sorted based on the multitasking condition and placed 
into either the multitasking or no-multitasking group. 
We applied the k-means algorithm using the six 
performance measures on these two groups respectively 
(Table 2). Furthermore, we used two different methods 
to normalize values of the six performance measures; 
i.e., the standard L2-norm function, also known as the 
Euclidean norm, as well as the MinMaxScaler function 
that normalizes the minimum and maximum bounds to 
0 and 1. These two methods generated compatible 
results.  
We experimented with different k values, from two 
to eight, and the most informative findings emerged for 
a division of three distinct subpopulations: 
• An “overachiever” cluster with strong overall 
performance, shown by blue circles in plots; 
• A “conservative” cluster featuring lower FNR 
and higher FPR, shown by green triangles; 
• A “naive” cluster featuring lower FPR and 
higher FNR, shown by red squares. 
These three clusters not only had clear partitions 
with regards to FNR, FPR, and other behavior measures, 
Figure 3. Clustering of participants in the no-multitasking condition using L2-norm normalization 
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but also possessed interesting patterns in the 
demographics of their member participants. 
The clustering results are shown below as a set of 
two-dimensional scatter plots (Figures 3-4). Each figure 
has four subplots, of which (a)-(c) are the performance 
measures used in clustering. In each (a) subplot, 
displaying FNR and FPR, a numeric label denotes the 
number of overlapping points, i.e., participants with the 
same FNR and FPR values. Each (b) subplot shows the 
two processing times of phishing emails vs. legitimate 
emails, also featuring linear regression lines fit on each 
cluster. Each (c) subplot, on participants’ average 
decision confidence ratings for phishing emails vs. 
legitimate emails, displays the three cluster centroids by 
cross markers (+). Finally, the (d) subplots show three 
pieces of important demographic information associated 
with the clusters, namely age, education level, and 
cybersecurity training, revealing a few patterns of note. 
 Figure 3 depicts the clustering results for the no-
multitasking participants using the L2-norm 
normalization method. As shown in Figure 3(a), naive-
cluster participants demonstrated comparatively high 
FNR, signifying that they were less successful in 
detecting phishing emails. Not coincidentally, as shown 
in Figure 3(b), these participants also spent more time 
classifying phishing emails than legitimate ones. 
Figure 4. Clustering of participants in the multitasking condition using L2-norm normalization 
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Similarly, conservative-cluster participants exhibited 
relatively high FPR: they experienced more difficulty 
classifying legitimate emails despite spending more 
time on these emails (and the monetary incentive may 
have led some to overthink and misclassify legitimate 
emails as phishing). 
 The overachiever cluster includes those 
participants with both low FNR and FPR. These 
participants also had the highest confidence level among 
the three clusters. The corresponding linear regression 
line in Figure 3(b) indicates that these participants 
showed an overall slight tendency to spend less time on 
phishing emails. One potential explanation is that they 
had to examine a legitimate email thoroughly, e.g., 
checking more phishing cues, before confidently 
moving it to the “keep” folder. However, they only 
needed to find enough evidence of suspicion to correctly 
classify a phishing email. This seems to support a 
similar strategy used in the simulation study of no-
multitasking users as reported in [6]. 
Intuitively, higher confidence ratings would be 
associated with better performance. As shown in Figure 
3(c), confidence ratings of different clusters in general 
reflected their relative success at detecting phishing, 
legitimate, or both types of emails. However, points 
from different clusters are interspersed: some 
conservative-cluster participants were less confident on 
legitimate emails, and some naive-cluster participants 
expressed higher confidence on phishing emails. 
(Similarly, Figure 3(b) also features overlap between 
clusters on email processing time.) These observations, 
consistent with findings in our previous reports, 
highlight the difficulty of relying on one or two criteria 
to characterize security behaviors, and the necessity of 
a comprehensive approach such as clustering. 
 Figure 3(d) highlights several interesting 
demographic trends on the roles of cybersecurity 
training experience, advanced education, and age on 
phishing classification. All participants with 
cybersecurity training, across all education levels, lie in 
the overachiever cluster, as do all but one individual 
possessing master’s or doctoral degrees. This seems to 
suggest that academic study or training can effectively 
improve a person’s security behavior. Additionally, 
only one of the participants older than 45 is in the 
overachiever cluster. This may suggest a negative effect 
of aging on phishing classification, representing a 
widespread challenge to confront in societies with aging 
populations. We note that none of the above-45 
participants possessed a graduate degree or had 
cybersecurity training, complicating our ability to 
determine whether age, lack of education/training, or a 
combination influenced their comparatively poorer 
performance. Further effort is highly desirable to study 
this phenomenon. 
 The MinMaxScaler normalization method resulted 
in clusters similar to, but seemingly less distinct than, 
the L2-norm function. The average confidence ratings 
apparently played a more significant role in forming 
these clusters. While participants reporting the highest 
confidence ratings mostly fell in the overachiever 
cluster, the three clusters are mixed with regards to FNR 
and FPR. Demographically, these clusters exhibit 
almost identical patterns to those in Figure 3(d). 
Figure 4 shows the clustering results for the 
multitasking participants. Performance of the 
multitasking participants was generally poorer than 
single-tasking participants, as previously reported. 
Consequently, the data points are further away from the 
best performance, i.e., (0,0) in Figure 4(a) and (10,10) 
in Figure 4(c). As shown in Figure 4(b), these 
multitasking participants used less time overall to 
process emails. 
The results indicate that multitasking significantly 
impacted the patterns among the three clusters. This is 
shown by the increased cluster scattering in Figures 4(a) 
and 4(c) as compared to corresponding subplots in 
Figure 3. Still, some broader trends remain present: 
naive-cluster participants spent more time processing 
phishing emails, while conservative-cluster participants 
spent more time on legitimate emails. Interestingly, the 
corresponding linear regression line in Figure 4(b) 
indicates that multitasking participants in the 
overachiever cluster now spent relatively less time on 
legitimate emails than phishing emails. Such behavior 
contrasts with that of the no-multitasking participants in 
this cluster, as seen in Figure 3(b), and might signal a 
shift in the strategy described previously.  
Lastly, Figure 4(d) does not exhibit the 
demographic patterns as seen for no-multitasking 
participants. Multitasking participants with previous 
security training exhibited no increase in performance, 
showing multitasking to be a negative performance 
equalizer. (We note that a high number of multitasking 
participants older than 45 fell in the naive cluster, 
indicating that the secondary task might have more 
greatly impacted their ability to detect phishing emails.)  
5. Further discussion  
Interpretations - The complexity of human 
security behaviors makes sophisticated analysis regimes 
necessary for revealing insightful patterns. Initially, 
understanding the roles of incentives and demographics 
on user performance proved challenging. Through the 
combined efforts of the statistical tests and clustering 
analysis described in this work, as well as the analyses 
in several previously-published reports, we have 
developed reasonable conclusions as to the influence of 
these factors. 
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Multitasking has a significant negative effect on 
participants’ capability to identify phishing emails and 
greatly changes patterns shown for participants only 
occupied by the email sorting task. This is unsurprising, 
considering the overhead caused by frequently 
switching between the two tasks. Surprisingly, 
monetary incentives are ineffective at improving critical 
decision making during phishing recognition. These 
findings would demand appropriate adjustment of 
strategies for security behavior interventions. 
More importantly, demographic and background 
traits, including education level, experience of 
cybersecurity training, age, and knowledge of phishing 
cues, represent useful and reliable predictors for a 
participant's security behaviors. Such findings echo 
other studies including that by Sheng et al. [5]. These 
results offer further support for the role of education and 
security training in improving critical skills in security 
tasks. They are especially informative for developing 
individualized and customized anti-phishing strategies.  
Limitations - The first challenge comes from the 
constraints of an unattended empirical study that relied 
on maintaining participants’ attention. We had to 
consider factors including the session time, Internet 
connection, types of web browser, etc., in experiment 
design and execution. We could only accommodate 40 
emails that likely do not accurately reflect the real-world 
ratio of legitimate to phishing emails (although the 
50/50 split is consistent with previous phishing 
research). The phishing cues may not be fully 
representative of all possible cases. Moreover, arguably 
a larger number of participants per condition could have 
enabled more conclusive findings. 
The second challenge lies in information 
availability and quality. Certain information modalities 
are not available from unattended experiments. For 
example, we were not able to capture eye gaze 
movement so could not conclusively determine whether 
participants focused on a certain element in an email. 
While we disabled all unused functions on the 
Roundcube interface, the nature of such a remotely-
conducted, Internet-based user study means that noise 
might still be introduced if participants did not follow 
instructions closely. However, such variation is an 
inherent risk for any user study conducted in similar 
real-world settings. 
6. Conclusion  
This work is unique in characterizing empirical data 
of phishing decision-making, gathered on real users in a 
real-world scenario, and through the range of clustering 
and other analyses. The presented findings touched only 
a part of the rich information available in the complete 
dataset of our phishing study, publicly available at 
http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/. Ongoing and future efforts 
aim to examine additional information in these data. 
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